Spontaneous Order Approach in Political Science

Piotr Szafruga

doi:10.62374/bhpk2y14

Authors

Piotr Szafruga Jagiellonian University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62374/bhpk2y14

Keywords:

uncertainty, social structures, institutions, Public Choice, Fragile States, Veil of Ignorance

Abstract

The theory of spontaneous order conceptualizes and explains institutions and social phenomena which are not deliberately created, buy rather emerged as an unintended effect of grassroots activity of individuals following their own aims. Moreover, it argues that complex social structures cannot be formed deliberately. Due to human cognitive limitations these structures emerge only in unplanned manner. However, this approach is not widely recognised in social sciences, especially in political science. Addressing this situation the article implies that theory of spontaneous order can find application in explaining political phenomena. It presents an overview of some of possible areas within the scope of political science where theory of spontaneous order may provide valuable insight into studied phenomena. The proposed approach helps understanding the coordinative character of spontaneous processes and introduces new arguments to the discussions about conceptions and theories already present in political science, like the theory of public choice or the conception of veil of ignorance.

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